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THE PRIVATE USE OF THE SOCIAL NETWORKS 
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“ACHILLES’ HEEL’’ OF PERSONAL DATA 
PROTECTION IN PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY 
INSTITUTIONS?
by
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Public order and security systems represent structures in which both protection of  
classified information and protection of personal data are strictly regulated by laws,  
internal  regulations  and concrete  measures  to  protect  computer  communication  
networks. We conducted an empirical study by interviewing a group of 150 people  
belonging to the public order and security institutions that shows that a significant  
percentage of them use social networks outside work program in private life. Based  
on the conclusions of the study and the empirical observations made on some of the  
public order and security institutions staff we outline the need to analyze the pos-
sible risks to their professional activity deriving from insufficient protection of their  
personal data during the use of social networks. Furthermore, we argue that these  
risks are amplified in the case of police officers who have to do undercover work us -
ing in the same time the mobile Internet. Finally, we argue that this type of attitude  
endangers law enforcement and security of the officers and it is influenced by two  
factors: the weakness of SNSs data protection regulations and  the freedom of ex-
pression exercised carelessly by the public order and security institutions staff. In  
order to find remedies for this vulnerability created by this "security breach" de-
rived from the private activity of public order and security institutions staff in so-
cial networks, we propose to continue the empirical study to find the reasons behind  
this type of behaviour and if they have reasonable expectations of privacy related to  
SNSs policies of data protection. Based on these findings we could be focused on de-
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veloping an adequate training programme concerning this issue for police officers  
or the public order and security institutions staff  because they are professionals  
who might give a special attention to these issues.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The protection of personal data represents a relatively new field for Ro-
mania’s legislative space. Its’ essence regards, in a generic form, the natural 
person’s right of protection of those specific features which lead to his/her 
identification  and the  state’s  correlative  obligation  of  adopting  adequate 
measures to ensure an efficient protection.
There is  need for a comprehensive discussion of the legal framework 
concerning  personal  data  protection.  Even so,  we will  only  mention  the 
main regulation in order to outline that the legal framework is not essential 
regarding the private activity of public order and security institutions staff 
in social networks. The most important regulation in this field are: Law No. 
677/2001 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and the Free Movement of Such Data, Published in the Offi-
cial Journal of Romania, Part I, No. 790/12 December 2001, amended and 
completed, Law no. 682 of 28th November 2001 on the ratification of the 
Convention on the protection of individuals with regard to automatic pro-
cessing of personal data, adopted in Strasbourg on the 28 th January 1981 
Published in the Official Journal no. 830 of the 21 December 2001, Law no. 
102/2005 regarding the setting up, organisation and functioning of the Na-
tional Supervisory Authority for Personal Data Processing, Law no. 55 of 
17th March 2005 on the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Con-
vention  for  the  protection  of  individuals  with  regard  to  automatic  pro-
cessing of personal data, regarding supervisory authorities and transborder 
data flows, adopted in Strasbourg on 18th November 2001, published in the 
Official Journal no. 244 of 23 March 2005, Emergency Ordinance no. 36 from 
9 of May 2007 for the annulment of the Law no. 476/2003 regarding the ap-
proval of the personal data processing notification tax which fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Law no. 677/2001 for the protection of persons regarding 
the processing of personal ata and the free movement of such data, pub-
lished  in  the  Official  Monitor  with  no.  335 from 17 May 2007,  Law no. 
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298/2008 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with 
the provisions of publicly available electronic communications services or of 
public  communications  networks  and  for  the  amendment  of  Law  no. 
506/2004 on the processing of personal data and the protection of private 
life  within the electronic  communication sector,  Published in the Official 
Journal no. 780 of 21st of November 2008.
Under the Law no. 677/2001 on the person’s protection regarding the 
processing of personal data and the free circulation of these data, the acquis 
represented by the Directive no. 95/46/EC was implemented, which sets up 
the general juridical frame of the personal data protection at European Uni-
on level. For this purpose, a central authority empowered with such control 
competence, the National  Authority for the Supervision of Personal Data 
Processing,  came  into  existence  in  Romania,  too.  Under  the  Law  no. 
102/2005,  the Authority  exerts  the competence established mainly  by the 
Law no. 677/2001, in terms of independence from any public authority or 
private entity.
The competences of the National Authority for the Supervision of Per-
sonal Data Processing are specific for any institution of control, including 
the investigation of personal data processing conducted under the Law no. 
677/2001 and the sanctioning, if it comes out that the legal dispositions were 
infringed by the personal data processors, as a result of self-notification or 
based on complaints filed by the people who’s rights were infringed.
The  Authority  has  the  goal  of  protecting  the  fundamental  rights  and 
freedoms of the natural persons, especially the right of intimate, family and 
private life, in connection with the processing of personal data and the free 
circulation of these data.
The National Authority for the Supervision of Personal Data Processing 
carries out its’ activity in terms of complete independence and impartiality. 
The authority supervises and controls the legality of the personal data pro-
cessing which falls under the Law no. 677/2001. For this purpose, the super-
visory authority exerts the following prerogatives: receives and examines 
the notifications on the processing of personal data, authorizes the data pro-
cessing in the situations stipulated by the law, can decide, if it ascertains the 
infringement of this law, the temporary suspension or the cessation of the 
data processing, the partial or entire erasure of the processed data and can 
inform the penal bodies or sue, informs the natural and/or juridical persons 
about the necessity of complying with the obligations and carrying out the 
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procedures stipulated by Law no. 677/2001, keeps and lays at public dispos-
al the register of recording the personal data processing, receives and solves 
the complaints, intimations or requests of the natural persons and commu-
nicates the given solution or, according to each case, the approaches carried 
out, performs preliminary controls, if the data processor processes personal 
data which are liable of presenting special risks for the persons’ rights and 
freedoms,performs investigations, at self-notification or at the reception of 
complaints or intimations, is consulted when normative acts regarding the 
protection of persons’  rights and freedoms,  concerning the personal data 
processing, are drafted, can make proposals regarding the drafting of norm-
ative acts or modifying of normative acts in force, in the field of personal 
data processing, cooperates with the public authorities and public adminis-
tration bodies, centralizes and examines their annual reports regarding the 
people’s protection concerning the processing of personal data, issues re-
commendations and approvals on any matter connected to the protection of 
the fundamental  rights and freedoms,  concerning the personal data pro-
cessing, at any person’s request, including public authorities and public ad-
ministration bodies,  cooperates  with similar  authorities  from abroad,  for 
mutual  assistance,  as  well  as  with  persons  with  residence  or  premises 
abroad, for the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms which 
may be affected by the personal data processing, carries out other compet-
ences stipulated by law.1
Because public order and security systems represent structures in which 
both protection of classified information and protection of personal data are 
strictly regulated by laws, and other regulations, we are interested in de-
scribing the behaviour of civil servants related to the use of the social net-
works outside work program in private life. 
We can say that, in terms of legislation and organization in institutions 
like  Romanian  Police,  Romanian  Gendarmerie,  Anti-Corruption  General 
Directorate,  General  Directorate  of  Intelligence  and  Internal  Protection, 
there is a good protection of the personal data of the subjects which are in-
vestigated. Moreover, in certain areas of processing information with a high 
level of classification it is not allowed the introduction by the civil servants 
of any tools that might store data or of any device which has an Internet 
connection to transmit any information held in the spaces. So even if these 
1 http://www.dataprotection.ro/index.jsp?page=about&lang=en, the site of National Author-
ity for the Supervision of Personal Data Processing, consulted at 06/02/2013;
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measures are restricting civil right to communicate freely even in the profes-
sional environments, the internal communication networks of public order 
and security institutions limited the access to social networking, namely us-
ing UGC services (User Generated Content).
We conducted an empirical study by interviewing a group of 150 people 
belonging to the public order and security institutions that shows that a sig-
nificant percentage of them use social networks outside work program in 
private life.
2 THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION IN SOCIAL LIFE
Before presenting the findings of our empirical study, we searched to ex-
plain some issues which might come into discussion in our results and con-
clusions:
2.1. The public-private distinction in social life. 
2.2. The concept of ”social networks” and the difficulty of sustaining a pub-
lic/private distinction in social networks; the need for a tool of keeping the 
private and the public dimension of life as distinct as the individual wants.
2.1 THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION IN SOCIAL LIFE
Social  and  legal  theorists  have  grappled  with  the  subtleties  of  the 
public/private distinction. Nissenbaum2 introduces the concept of contextu-
al integrity, which states that within a context of an interaction, people have 
expectations about what information is appropriate to collect and whether it 
should be distributed. Nissenbaum stresses that ideas about contextual in-
tegrity vary across time, place, and culture. However, she does not account 
for variations within a particular context. People have different expectations 
about what information can be shared or what constitutes sensitive inform-
ation. One useful lens for understanding differences in expectations about 
identity and content sharing within social  networks is  the concept of the 
fractalization of the public and private.3 Nissenbaum argues that some pri-
vacy is required for individuals to self-actualize. Privacy is arguably neces-
sary  for  advancing  the  self  and protecting  the  integrity  of  relationships. 
Having insulation against outside scrutiny is important for experimenting 
with aspects of the self without fear of retribution.
2 Nissenbaum, H., 2004,  Privacy as contextual integrity. Washington Law Review, 79(1), 101–
158;
3 Lange P.G.,  2008,  Publicly  Private  and Privately  Public:  SocialNetworking  on  YouTube, 
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 13 361–380, International Communication 
Association, p.362;
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The terms ‘public’ and ‘private’ have described social phenomena ran-
ging from the political and economic to the spatial and personal.
As it was argued in some a recent work, at this sociohistorical juncture, it 
is more appropriate to treat public and private as anchors at either end of a 
continuum, with multiple and fluid interstitial categories.4
Our days, the separation between public and private became less abso-
lute. The breakdown between public and private is apparent on a number 
of levels. While work is still ‘public’ and home and leisure are still ‘private’,  
the distance between them, physical, temporal, and spatial, has shrunk.
This situation is reflected also in juridical decisions. For instance, the de-
cision in Von Hannover v Germany (No. 2) is the second of two given on 7  
February 2012 by the Grand Chamber concerning the balancing of privacy 
and freedom of expression.  In a unanimous decision, the Grand Chamber 
found that Germany had not failed in its obligation to respect the applic-
ants’ Article 8 rights when it refused to grant an injunction against the pub-
lication of a photograph taken of Princess Caroline and her husband while 
on holiday at a ski resort in Switzerland. Von Hannover (No. 2) attempts to 
narrow the  focus  when attempting  to  balance  two equal  but  competing 
rights. This judgment was unanimous and appears to place a higher value 
on the protection of one’s image than to the protection of one’s reputation, 
the latter of which must attain a certain level of seriousness in order to en-
gage Article 8. The judgment will doubtless be a welcome contribution to 
the English privacy law debate and it will be interesting to see how the Eng-
lish courts apply these principles in future cases.5
We cannot make anymore a clear analysis of the privacy concept because 
this concept became ‘blurry’ or we can say that its limits depend on the situ-
ation related to the idea of privacy. As a comprehensive study6 on this issue 
stated in conclusion, ”the public/private distinction is one of the most influ-
ential  concepts of the modern era, both in  terms of social  theory and in 
terms of everyday life. The assumption that public and private are a dicho-
tomous pair has influenced numerous aspects of social life,  ranging from 
the gendered division of labor to the development of the suburb. For many, 
4 Sarah Michele Ford, 2011,  Reconceptualizing The Public/Private Distinction In The Age Of 
Information Technology, Information, Communication & Society, 14:4, 550-567;
5 Case Law: Von Hannover v Germany (No.2) – Unclear clarification and unappreciated mar-
gins – Kirsten Sjøvoll
http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2012/02/10/case-law-von-hannover-v-germany-no-2-unclear-
clarification-and-unappreciated-margins-kirsten-sjovoll/
6 Sarah Michele Ford, 2011, op.cit., p.567;
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public and private have been treated as completely separate. However, the 
division between the public and private realms was not impermeable. The 
public  and private  realms have bled  over  into  one another,  and can  no 
longer be treated as a dichotomous pair”. Based on patterns of social change 
and examples from mass media and information and communications tech-
nologies,  the  author  has  shown  that  a  more  fruitful  conception  of  the 
public/private realms is one that treats them as anchors on either end of a  
continuum, with liminal categories being created and destroyed as needed. 
The final idea is that the line between public and private has become blurry; 
these concepts are no longer polar opposites,  and the social  world is  at-
tempting to sort out how to deal with the loss of one of its fundamental cat-
egories.
2.2 THE CONCEPT OF “SOCIAL NETWORKS” AND THE DIFFICULTY 
OF  SUSTAINING  A  PUBLIC/PRIVATE  DISTINCTION  IN  SOCIAL 
NETWORKS
Social network websites were described as web-based services that allow in-
dividuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded 
system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connec-
tion, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by 
others within the system. The nature and nomenclature of these connections 
may vary from site to site.7
The concept of ‘‘social networks’’ is difficult to define. Wellman8 argues 
that online and offline social networks do not exist as such, but that they are 
useful analytic constructs for understanding social dynamics. A social net-
work will look different depending upon how one measures it (counting the 
number of interactions between members versus rating the closeness of re-
lationships,  for  instance).  A  social  network  is  defined  here  as  relations 
among people who deem other network members to be important or relev-
ant to them in some way.9
Currently, there are no reliable  data regarding how many people use 
SNSs, although marketing research indicates that SNSs are growing in pop-
ularity worldwide.
7 Boyd, D. M., & Ellison, N. B., 2007, Social network sites: Definition, history, and scholarship.  
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 13(1), article 11;
8 Wellman, B.,1996, Are personal communities  local? A Dumptarian reconsideration.Social 
Networks, 18(4), 347–354.
9 Wellman, B. ,1996, op.cit.;
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This growth has prompted many corporations to invest time and money 
in creating, purchasing, promoting, and advertising SNSs. At the same time, 
other companies are blocking their employees from accessing the sites. Ad-
ditionally, the U.S. military banned soldiers from accessing MySpace10 and 
the Canadian government prohibited employees from Facebook11, while the 
U.S. Congress has proposed legislation to ban youth from accessing SNSs in 
schools and libraries.12
Even in our country, in public order and security institutions as Romani-
an  Police,  Romanian  Gendarmerie,  Anti-Corruption  General  Directorate, 
General Directorate of Intelligence and Internal Protection Moreover, it  is 
not allowed the introduction by the civil servants of any tools that might 
store data or of any device which has an Internet connection to transmit any 
information held in the spaces. So even if these measures are restricting civil 
right to communicate freely even in the professional environments, the in-
ternal communication networks of Romanian public order and security in-
stitutions limited the access to social networking. Therefore, there are ten-
sions between law enforcement and individual freedom in this work envir-
onment.
Researchers have investigated the potential threats to privacy associated 
with SNSs. In one of the first academic studies of privacy and SNSs, Gross 
and Acquisti13 analyzed 4,000 Carnegie Mellon University Facebook profiles 
and outlined the potential threats to privacy contained in the personal in-
formation included on the site by students, such as the potential ability to 
reconstruct users' social security numbers using information often found in 
profiles, such as hometown and date of birth. 
Acquisti and Gross14 argue that there is often a disconnect between stu-
dents' desire to protect privacy and their behaviors, a theme that is also ex-
10 Frosch, D., 2007, May 15, Pentagon blocks 13 web sites from military computers. New York 
Times. Retrieved July 21, 2007, from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/washington/15b-
lock.html; 
11 Benzie, R., 2007, May 3, Facebook banned for Ontario staffers. The Star. Retrieved July 21, 
2007 from http://www.thestar.com/News/article/210014;
12 Boyd, D. M., & Ellison, N. B, 2007, Social network sites: Definition, history, and scholarship.  
Journal  of  Computer-Mediated  Communication,  13(1),  article  11. 
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html; 
13 Gross, R.,  & Acquisti,  A.,  2005, Information revelation and privacy in online social  net -
works. Proceedings of WPES'05 (pp. 71-80). Alexandria, VA: ACM;
14 Acquisti,  A.,  & Gross, R.,  2006, Imagined communities: Awareness, information sharing, 
and privacy on the Facebook. In P. Golle & G. Danezis (Eds.), Proceedings of 6th Workshop 
on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (pp. 36-58). Cambridge, UK: Robinson College;
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plored in Stutzman's15 survey of Facebook users and Barnes's16 description 
of the "privacy paradox" that occurs when teens are not aware of the public 
nature of the Internet.  In analyzing trust on social  network sites,  Dwyer, 
Hiltz,  and Passerini17 argued that  trust  and usage goals may affect  what 
people are willing to share—Facebook users expressed greater trust in Face-
book than MySpace users did in MySpace and thus were more willing to 
share information on the site.18
SNSs are also challenging legal conceptions of privacy. Hodge19 argued 
that the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and legal decisions con-
cerning privacy are not equipped to address social network sites.  For ex-
ample, do police officers have the right to access content posted to Facebook 
without a warrant? The legality of this hinges on users' expectation of pri -
vacy and whether or not Facebook profiles are considered public or private.
3 THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
Considering these findings we were interested in  studying the police  of-
ficers behaviour in SNSs in their spare time outside the work environment 
and the way this  privacy/public  balance  regarding the share of personal 
data could influence some of their work activities. 
We conducted an empirical study by interviewing a group of 150 people 
belonging to the public  order and security  institutions  about their  beha-
viour in SNSs and the concern they show for the protection of the privacy of 
their personal data. We were interested to find whether they understand 
how to protect their  privacy and their  personal data on SNSs. The issue 
might become relevant to their work because the police officers often come 
into contact with criminal environments while working, the risks they are 
15 Stutzman, F., 2006, An evaluation of identity-sharing behavior in social network communit-
ies. Journal of the International Digital Media and Arts Association, 3 (1), 10-18;
16 Barnes, S., 2006, A privacy paradox: Social networking in the United States. First Monday, 
11  (9).  Retrieved  September  8,  2007  from 
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue11_9/barnes/index.html;
17 Dwyer, C., Hiltz, S. R., & Passerini, K., 2007, Trust and privacy concern within social net -
working sites: A comparison of Facebook and MySpace. Proceedings of AMCIS 2007, Key-
stone,  CO.  Retrieved  September  21,  2007  from 
http://csis.pace.edu/~dwyer/research/DwyerAMCIS2007.pdf;
18 Boyd, D. M., & Ellison, N. B., 2007, Social network sites: Definition, history, and scholarship.  
Journal  of  Computer-Mediated  Communication,  13(1),  article  11. 
,http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html;
19 Hodge, M. J., 2006, The Fourth Amendment and privacy issues on the "new" Internet: Face-
book.com and MySpace.com. Southern Illinois University Law Journal, 31, 95-122;
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subject to being extended beyond the working hours, sometimes in private 
life, including in their activity on social networks.
Although there are methodological problems with determination of rep-
resentative sample, with collection of data and therefore there are doubts 
about methodological accuracy, we searched for some answers to the ques-
tions which have not been asked before in Romanian public order and se-
curity institutions.
We asked the questions presented below:
1. How often do you access the Internet in the following en-
vironment: at home, at work, in other places?
1=every day; 2=a few times a week; 3=once a week; 4=a few times 
per month;5=rarely;6=never;
Chart no. 1: The frequency of accessing the Internet
These findings show that a significant percentage of  the subjects (82%) 
use Internet outside of the work program, in private life. We assume that 
this kind of behaviour is determined by the security measures taken in the 
work place to protect computer communication networks and the informa-
tion they work with.
This raises the following question: do they understand that they need to 
protect their privacy and even their personal data? Are the security meas-
ures as important in private life as they are in their work environment? In 
order to establish that, we asked the next questions.
2. Do you have a profile on SNSs (as Facebook, Myspace etc.)?
1=yes 2=no
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Chart no. 2: The existence of an account in SNSs
3. How often do you use this account?
1=every day, 2=every week, 3=rarely, 4=never
Chart no. 3: The frequency of using the account
First of all, we find that over 90 % of the police officers created a SNSs 
account and that over a half of them are using this account quite often (30% 
daily and 25% weekly).
Based on findings and the empirical observations made on some of the 
public order and security institutions staff, we outline the need to analyze 
the possible  risks  to  their  professional  activity  deriving from insufficient 
protection of their personal data during the use of these accounts. But first 
we needed to find what kind of information do they share on these SNSs.
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 The results were quite surprising considering the expectations we had 
from this type of group (trained in security issues and data protection regu-
lations).
4. What type of information did you share on SNSs (when register 
or using it)?
1. Financial information
2. Identification number
3. Name
4. Adress
5. Hobbies
6. Personal photos
7. Friends
8. Mobile phone number
9. e-mail
Chart no. 4: Type of information shared on SNSs account
As the results show, over 80% of the participants share the name, almost 
70% share personal photos, almost 80% give their e-mail and over 30% re-
vealed even their postal address.
These findings raise some questions regarding the level of protection of 
the personal data of civil servants who often come into contact with crimin-
al environments during working hours, the risks they are subject to being 
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extended beyond the working hours, sometimes in private life, including in 
their activity on social networks. Based on these results, we outline the need 
to analyze the possible risks to their professional activity. 
We argue that these risks are amplified in the case of police officers who 
have to do undercover work using in the same time the mobile Internet. 
They can be easily identified and even their location could be compromised.
4 CONCLUSION
Before analysing the results of this empirical study, we blamed the weak 
protection of personal data available on these websites. After the final res-
ults of the study, we think that this type of attitude endangers law enforce-
ment and security of the officers and it  is  influenced by two factors:  the 
weekness of SNSs data protection regulations and  the freedom of expres-
sion exercised carelessly by the public order and security institutions staff.
So, this posible ”Achilles' heel” of personal data protection in public or-
der and security institutions, as we named it in the title of the paper, could 
be a vulnerability created by this "security breach" derived from the private 
activity of public order and security institutions staff in social networks re-
lated mainly to their behaviour in SNSs. This careless attitude makes it pos-
sible for individuals with connections in criminal environments to view the 
personal data of civil servants or police officers and to become a risk to law 
enforcement institutions work and security. However,  even if  this is the 
main factor for this vulnerability, we could not say that the personal data 
protection system in SNSs is helping the process of law enforcement from 
this point of view. We think that securing the personal data, these social  
networks could facilitate changing regulations within the public order and 
security institutions, so that they could be included as additional databases 
in investigating crimes and for identifying suspects,  with the observation 
that the information they offer would be used with respect to the human 
privacy and dignity.
In order to find remedies for this vulnerability created by this "security 
breach" derived from the private activity of public order and security insti-
tutions staff in social networks, we propose two steps.
First, we need to continue this empirical study in order to find out the 
reasons and cause of this particular behaviour of the public order and secur-
ity  institutions  staff  in  social  networks.  We need to  find  out  if  they are 
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aware of the risks, if they have reasonable expectations of privacy related to 
SNSs policies of data protection. 
After that we could suggest some remedies, which, in our opinion, since 
the option "secure Facebook" is not realistic, could only be focused on devel-
oping  an adequate  training  programme concerning  this  issue  for  all  the 
public order and security institutions staff, that should be conducted start-
ing with their initial training years. Still,  an issue remains: does the SNSs 
agreement adequately explain how the data is being used and whether the 
consent provided by the user is sufficient to cover all the activities carried 
out by the service? We dare to say that it is not. As an additional argument 
to sustain this idea we can say, after looking at the results of this empirical 
study, that not even the trained personnel in security issues and personal 
data protection regulation was not aware of the risks of their  consent of 
sharing information on SNSs. 
We also think that different kinds of professional  activity of the SNSs 
users require distinctive levels of protection from outside parties; these are 
manifested in varied levels of publicness and privacy in SNSs activity. The 
police officers or the public order and security institutions staff are a type of 
professionals who might give a special attention to these issues. As argued, 
the notice and consent paradigm is worthless. Some simplification of those 
terms is  possible,  but  there’s  really very little  competitive  force  at  work 
there. No one knows that one company’s privacy agreement is better than 
another’s, or has the time to find out. Harry Lewis sees that ”the only real 
solution for the long run is education: teaching kids to think critically about 
the information they give and are given”.20
So, as we already stated, there are no significant legal implications of the 
findings of this empirical study. There are many regulation concerning per-
sonal  data protection in  public  order and security institutions.  The legal 
solution cannot solve an educational issue. Public order and security institu-
tion have to decide if the investment in trainings concerning those specific 
issues is justified by the possible risks. By these empirical findings, we iden-
tified a vulnerability, just opened a gate for scientific studies of the risks de-
rived from the private activity of public order and security institutions staff 
in social networks.
20 "The Public-Private Distinction Does Not Work Anymore"by Harry Lewis — 23.11.2011;  
http://theeuropean-magazine.com/387-lewis-harry/388-the-dark-side-of-technology.
